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The prohibition of retroactive law and other 
safeguards when conducting institutional 
reform: The right to non-recurrence in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina 
 
By Helga Molbæk-Steensig* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This article will review the potential conflicts between the principle of the prohibition 
of retroactive law and the transitional justice mechanism of vetting and lustration, 
and debate the best and safest route to restore the integrity of and the faith in public 
offices. The prohibition of retroactive law is the guiding principle behind the human 
right of nullum crimen/poena sine lege, the protection against punishment for 
something that was not a crime at the time it was committed.  
 
Vetting and lustration mechanisms are not the foremost candidates to come into 
conflict with this right, since the right cannot be utilised unless there are proceedings 
before a criminal court. The principle of universal jurisdiction means that the gravest 
crimes and human rights abuses are exempt from the principle of nullum crimen sine 
lege, because they are illegal under international law even if there is no national law. 
This leaves us in a situation where the principle is applicable neither when judging 
the gravest crimes, nor when administrative justice is employed. Lustration resulting 
in barring from a particular profession can, however, be an intensive interference 
with an individual’s daily life and access to the job market. Because of this intensity, 
the UN has issued four guidelines for conducting fair and efficient institutional 
reform.  
 
This article will touch upon the philosophical, practical and legal background for the 
prohibition of retroactive law in relation to the benefits of lustration, and conduct a 
discussion between the two concerns. Lustration mechanisms must be conducted in 
a fair manner, not just because it is the right of the accused, but for security reasons, 
and because lustration is conducted in part to restore faith in public institutions. The 
case of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH)’s police, and judicial reform will be utilised as 
an example of vetting and lustration mechanisms, its benefits and pitfalls.  
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Introduction 
The prohibition of retroactive law has two 
distinct functions, one with a human rights 
perspective – the nullum poena sine lege 
principle448 and one with a rule of law 
perspective. In a human rights view, the 
principle protects the individual from arbitrary 
government action and vengeance; from a rule 
of law perspective, the principle ensures the 
predictability of law. In researching for this 
essay, I hypothesized that vetting and 
lustration mechanisms, if performed according 
to the UN’s guidelines, will not come into 
conflict with the human rights perspective, but 
that they may come into conflict with the rule 
of law perspective. There are four UN 
guidelines for institutional reform to avoid 
conflict with the rule of law. In this article, I 
will establish a theoretic framework, debating 
the prohibition of retroactive law and the UN 
guidelines, and apply that framework to the 
cases of police and judicial reform in Bosnia, 
reviewing both legal procedures, compliance 
with transitional justice goals and security 
concerns.  
 
From a legal starting point, it is important to 
note that both nullum crimen and nullum poena 
will only come into play if there is a trial within 
criminal law. This is where the ‘administrative’ 
part of ‘administrative justice’ comes into play. 
Within the right to a fair trial, including the 
prohibition of retroactive law, a person’s 
freedom, which is often at risk in a criminal 
trial, is protected, but a person’s job security is 
not. Therefore, nullum crimen/poena sine lege 
is not applicable in cases of lustration that are 
not followed by a criminal trial. None the less, 
lustration can heavily influence an individual’s 
career and livelihood, and therefore it is 
important to ensure a fair assessment both 
materially and procedurally. For this reason, 
scholar and lawyer Andreu-Guzmán argues 
from a normative standpoint that accused at 
risk of dismissal should be afforded legal 
protections similar to those granted by art. 6 in 
the ECHR, even though the European Court 
has specifically attested that art. 6 does not 
apply to dismissal from public service.449 
 
Administrative justice 
For the purposes of this article, I will be 
employing Duthie’s definitions, in which 
purging refers to interventions aimed at a 
person’s affiliation with a group or party rather 
than individual responsibility for past abuses, 
                                              
 
448 ECHR art. 7 
449 Andreu-Guzmán 2007: 464-469 
which has a largely negative connotation.450 
The terms vetting and lustration both refer to 
the process of assessing an individual’s 
integrity and skill, with lustration as 
subsequent while vetting is prior to assuming 
office. The term ‘administrative justice’ will be 
used only in its technical sense as procedures 
carried out outside the judicial system. 
 
In a society transitioning out of conflict or 
authoritarian rule, reforming institutions can 
be necessary both to restore faith in those 
institutions and to ensure the integrity and 
fairness of them. Vetting and lustration are not 
mechanisms to ensure justice for the victims of 
corrupt or abusive institutions as they are not 
judicial mechanisms and cannot afford proper 
procedural protections to those accused. 
Rather, vetting and lustration mechanisms 
ensure the right to non-recurrence for victims 
of abuse and ensure effectiveness of public 
institutions. This means that in a lustration 
scenario, civil servants can be fired or barred 
without proof of criminal wrongdoing, but due 
to an assessment of impaired integrity or 
incompetence. In cases where it is suspected 
that criminal activities have taken place, the 
matter should be referred to a prosecutor and 
criminal court.  
 
Below are a few examples of how lustration has 
taken place in transitioning societies and how 
the mechanism can come into conflict with the 
prohibition of retroactive law, followed by the 
current UN guidelines for successful and fair 
vetting and lustration.  
 
 Jus post bellum 
Lustration/vetting is the systematic screening, 
barring and firing of people from official office 
positions due to an assessment that their 
integrity is impaired. In some instances, the 
process can be part of jus post bellum, the 
settlements reached to end a war. 
Meierhenrich argues that this should always 
be the case, because the lustration process 
inevitably creates winners and losers, which 
should be provided for outwardly in the terms 
of peace.451 “The principle of publicity demands 
the publication or promulgation of lustration 
guidelines (or guidelines for the administration 
of justice more generally) in advance of the 
war”452.  
 
                                              
 
450 Duchie 2007: 18 
451 Meierhenrich 2006: 102-103 
452 Ibid. 2006: 117 (his emphasis) 
133 
 
Meierhenrich writes his piece on lustration in 
relation to the US occupation of Iraq. In cases 
where the outcome of the war is uncertain and 
where the war was unplanned, such as in civil 
war situations, it is not always possible to 
publicize the lustration guidelines in advance 
of the war. In the case of BiH, the Dayton 
agreement does proscribe police and military 
reform,453 but it does not include specific 
guidelines for how such a lustration should 
take place. 
 
 Ordinary law 
In other cases, lustration can take place as 
ordinary legal procedures; this was the 
principle behind the lustrations in Denmark 
and Norway after the Second World War. The 
war itself was considered a violation of national 
and international law and the puppet regimes 
and collaborations with occupying Germany 
were thus unlawful as well. In this light, both 
lustrations and criminal trials of collaborators 
were simply the reintroduction of rule of law 
after the fall of the Nazi regime. While the 
lustrations did not come into conflict with 
human rights, the trials in some cases did, 
because the human right of nullum poena sine 
lege includes that the punishment for a crime 
cannot be retroactively increased. This means 
that in terms of sentences in Denmark and 
Norway, retroactive law was applied even to 
enforce the death penalty, which is a clear 
violation of nullum poena sine lege.454 This is 
important to the topic of institutional reform 
because a vengeful and unlawful prosecution 
of collaborators will not benefit the goal of 
restoring faith in public institutions.  
 
 UN guidelines 
In 2004, the Secretary General of the UN 
advocated vetting mechanisms because when 
preformed correctly they can play an important 
part in enhancing legitimacy and efficiency of 
public institutions. Meanwhile, the 
mechanisms can come into conflict with labour 
laws, and in the case of judicial reform, the 
human right to a fair trial. They risk creating a 
surge of unemployment and disgruntled 
groups; in the case of police and military these 
groups are armed and trained in combat, 
which could pose a security risk. 
 
The UN provides four recommendations for 
legitimate and safe vetting processes.455 First, 
they should function in a respectful manner 
                                              
 
453 Dayton Agreement annex 7 
454 Dahl 2006 
455 Secretary General 2004: 18 
towards both victims and those suspected. 
This is a demand for a fair assessment of the 
integrity of the accused without imposing on 
the states a demand of a full trial with the 
accompanying demands of legal assistance and 
contradiction, which is a lengthy and 
expensive process. This recommendation 
allows for administrative justice outside the 
judicial system whilst still making material 
demands.  
 
Second, civil society should be consulted early 
on and the public should be informed. This 
recommendation is in line with the general 
demands that trials should be public, but it 
also touches on the perception of fair 
institutions and respect for victims and 
employees. Civil society consists of both 
victims groups, unions for civil servants, and 
representatives from other groups in society. 
Consulting the civil society allows all interested 
parties a voice, which is important to review 
security and incoherency risks. Informing the 
public of the results contributes to restoring 
the image of the troubled institutions.  
 
Third, the vetting process should pay attention 
to skills and objective qualifications. This 
recommendation has to do with the risk of de-
skilling the civil service or public offices. It is 
particularly relevant in transitions from 
authoritarian rules to democracy where the 
class in charge may be the only one trained for 
power.  
 
Fourth, procedural protections should be 
afforded to all, whether existing members or 
new applicants. This is vital for an appearance 
of fairness and for the process to yield the 
desired result. By only vetting new hires, the 
existing institution would not be reformed, and 
if only the current employees were lustrated, 
continuity and effectiveness would not be 
ensured. Moreover, by affording the same 
procedural protections to both groups in terms 
of proof of incompetence or lack of integrity, 
the best candidates can be employed both in 
terms of skill and moral integrity. 
 
The prohibition of retroactive law 
"No law, made after a fact done, can make it a 
crime ... For before the law, there is no 
transgression of the law."456 
Although we have already determined that 
legally speaking, the human right to protection 
from retroactive law will rarely come into use 
in a vetting/lustration scenario, it is a central 
                                              
 
456 Hobbes, Leviathan (1651) as quoted by Popple 1989: 253 
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philosophical protection and normative 
guideline, which is why we will briefly go 
through it here. The prohibition of retroactive 
law has two distinct functions. One is as a 
human right, the other as a central element of 
the rule of law: legal certainty.  
 
 The human rights perspective 
An argument in favour of a prohibition of 
retroactive law is, similarly to all human rights 
provisions based in an attempt to protect the 
individual from the superior force that is 
society, particularly tyrannical societies.457 The 
same principle is at work in the freedom of 
religion or prohibition of discrimination or any 
other material human right. It is based in the 
idea of an inherent dignity for all human 
beings and the need for protection for the 
individual against a superior power. This 
means that individuals are rights-subjects, 
while institutions are duty-subjects. This 
reasoning explains how a powerful institution 
such as a civil service or a public office cannot 
be protected by the principle. The individual 
within that office is protected, but only in a 
situation where their human rights are 
affected.  
 
 Prohibition of retroactive law as 
legal certainty 
Another argument for the prohibition of 
retroactivity is that it is a central part of legal 
certainty. Legal scholar Maxeiner is an 
advocate for this view: 
“As a general principle of European legal 
systems, legal certainty “requires that all law be 
sufficiently precise to allow the person—if need 
be, with appropriate advice—to foresee, to a 
degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, 
the consequences which a given action may 
entail.” (Korchuganova v Russia 2006 at 
ECtHR). It means that: (1) laws and decisions 
must be made public; (2) laws and decisions 
must be definite and clear; (3) decisions of 
courts must be binding; (4) limitations on 
retroactivity of laws and decisions must be 
imposed; and (5) legitimate expectations must 
be protected.”458 
 
In other words, the prohibition of retroactivity 
is a central principle of the rule of law. Without 
it, it would be impossible to predict one’s legal 
position. The idea that legal certainty is 
accomplishable is central in Europe while 
American scholars have, to a degree, since the 
1920s moved towards the theory of realism, 
                                              
 
457 Popple 1989: 254 
458 Maxiener 2008: 32 
arguing that legal certainty is not always 
possible and judge-made law is a reality. A 
central term here is legal indeterminacy, the 
idea that because it is impossible to foresee 
one’s legal position with absolute certainty, an 
individual should be guided by the law as well 
as their morals and they should be protected 
from arbitrary government action.459 This 
American approach is closer to the ‘protection 
of the individual’ argument I made above. The 
principle of legal certainty and by proxy the 
prohibition of retroactivity is there to protect 
the individual from arbitrary government 
action; it is not there to protect an arbitrarily 
abusive institution from justice. 
 
While legal certainty is a good ideal, the 
importance of case law is a testament to its 
unobtainability. In relation to institutional 
reform, the principle is therefore not a 
convincing reason not to complete lustration 
and vetting mechanisms.  
  
 The prohibition of retroactive law in 
relation to universal jurisdiction 
The Rome statute established the International 
Criminal Court and entered into force in 2002. 
Although it deals with crimes that may fall 
under universal jurisdiction, it also has 
provisions on the prohibition of retroactive 
law.460 The crimes within its jurisdiction – 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and the crime of aggression461 – are not 
subjectable to any statute of limitations462, but 
crimes committed before the statute’s entry 
into force cannot be judged under the 
statute.463  
 
However, the concept of universal jurisdiction 
for grave crimes is not new, and it was in force 
before the Yugoslav wars. For example, the 
Geneva conventions and protocols dating from 
the 1940s maintain that all signatories are 
obliged to search for and put before their own 
courts people indicted for: Wilful killing, 
torture, inhumane treatment and unlawful 
destruction or appropriation of property, 
unlawful deportation or detainment, as well as 
a few other crimes.464 The Nuremberg trials, 
which took place before the establishment of 
                                              
 
459 Ibid.: 36 
460 Rome statute art. 22-24 
461 Ibid. art. 5 
462 Ibid. Art. 29 
463 Ibid. Art. 24(1) 
464 Convention I Art 49(1,2) and 50, Convention II art 50 and 
51, Convention III art 129-130 (extradition also possible), 
Convention IV art 146-147, Protocol I art 85 
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the ICC and ICJ, gained their legal basis from 
The Hague conventions and the first Geneva 
protocols, dating from the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century, utilising 
the concept of customary law to indict 
Germany even though the country had not 
signed Hague conventions. 
 
The ICTY gains its jurisdiction from the 
universal jurisdiction clauses in the Geneva 
conventions465 and the power of the UN 
Security Council to establish ad hoc criminal 
tribunals. The latter has been disputed by 
some of those indicted by the court, but the 
former is indisputably established in the 
Geneva conventions and ratified by 196 
countries and is an established fact in 
international law.  
 
The question then remains, whether the 
enabling crimes of a corrupt administration fall 
within the protection of nullum crimen/poena 
sine lege or whether the resulting crimes of 
that negligence or corruption are harsh enough 
that universal jurisdiction applies. In 
international law, the Geneva conventions’ lists 
of crimes under universal jurisdiction has been 
considered exhaustive, which means that 
lesser and other crimes are not under 
universal jurisdiction and the perpetrators are 
thus protected by the prohibition of retroactive 
law. On the other hand, the crimes committed 
by an abusive regime or during war times have 
often been illegal under then-domestic law as 
well as under current law, though not 
enforced. Here it is relevant to note that non-
enforcement or non-outlawing human rights 
abuses can be a human rights violation, as 
was established at the ECtHR in the Söderman 
v Sweden case.466  
 
Institutional reform in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
The above findings establish a theoretical 
framework upon which a material analysis can 
take place. The key points of the framework 
can be summarised as follows. The human 
right of nullum poena sine lege, like all human 
rights is an instrument for protecting the weak 
from the strong, and therefore it cannot be 
used to protect an abusive public institution 
from the consequences of abusing citizens. 
Moreover, the prohibition of retroactive law is 
only applicable in criminal trials where the 
accused’s personal freedom is at risk.467 There 
                                              
 
465 ICTY statute art. 2 
466 Söderman v Sweden 2013 
467 ECHR art. 7 
is nothing in the ECHR to hinder a change in 
labour laws that allows for lustration. In the 
case of employees in the judicial system, the 
removal of life tenure may come into conflict 
with the human right to a fair trial468 because 
the ECtHR considers protections such as 
predictable judge tenure necessary to ensure 
the independence of a court.469  
 
However, there are other elements to consider 
when completing institutional reform including 
vetting and lustration. The four UN guidelines, 
(1) respect for victims and the accused, (2) 
inclusion of civil society and informing the 
public, (3) attention to skills, and (4) process 
and protections to both existing and future 
employees, include elements to ensure fairness 
and efficiency in institutional reform. These 
guidelines are made to ensure non-recurrence 
both by not enraging the group being vetted, 
which is why the process must be fair, and to 
ensure that the institutions are reformed to 
contain neither the individuals nor the policies 
and traditions of abuse. In the following 
paragraphs, I will review the Bosnian police 
and judicial reform in relation to the UN 
guidelines and the security and non-
recurrence considerations.  
 
In 2007, the international centre for 
transitional justice (ICTJ) published a book on 
institutional reform as a transitional justice 
mechanism. In Alexander Mayer-Rieckh’s 
chapter on institutional reform in BiH, he 
distinguishes between two kinds of reform: the 
BiH judicial reform was a reappointment-type 
reform, while the police reform was a review-
type reform.470 In a reappointment scenario, 
the institution is reformed and all employees 
will have to reapply for the new positions, and 
some will be reappointed while others will not. 
In a review scenario, all employees are 
reviewed for their skill and integrity, and those 
that are not up to specs are fired or barred 
from their positions, while the rest keep their 
positions. This creates two very different 
narratives; those not reappointed are not as 
stigmatised as those reviewed and found not to 
be qualified, because a non-reappointment 
may be similar to a firing from cutbacks while 
failing the review suggests wrongdoing. In 
some cases, where the public opinion of the 
institution is damaged because of lack of 
integrity, the stigma may be necessary to 
improve public trust in the institution. In the 
                                              
 
468 ECHR art. 6(1) 
469 Baka v Hungary 2016 § 78 
470 Mayer-Rieckh 2007: 182, 208 
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BiH case, the review of the police force was 
more controversial than the reappointment of 
judges and prosecutors, despite the fact that 
life tenure is the rule for judges in the current 
BiH constitution,471 and a recommendation for 
the human right of a fair trial.472 
 
The reasoning behind the vetting processes of 
the police and judiciary were also different. The 
police force had two major problems. First, the 
number of police officers pre-vetting was three 
times the number of officers pre-war, which 
suggested that a large number were not 
trained police,473 and second, the police force 
harboured ethno-nationalist sentiments, did 
not consistently investigate incidents where 
minorities were threatened or hurt, and 
contained individuals who had contributed to 
war crimes in the 1990s.474 Meanwhile the 
main problem with the judiciary was 
inefficiency and cost. There were too many 
courts and their backlogs were substantial. 
 
Police reform 
In addition to doubts about the aptitude and 
integrity of officers, there were also more 
common problems with the police force. There 
were very few female and minority officers, 
which hurt representativeness, and law 
enforcement was perceived as habitually 
corrupt. Vetting the police force was part of the 
Dayton Agreement Annex seven on the safe 
return of refugees,475 but efforts to complete it 
in the early years after Dayton did not succeed, 
in part because of political obstruction. This 
led to the UN resolution 1088 in 1996, which 
increased the mandate of the United Nations 
Mission in BiH (UNMIBH) including the 
international police force and the power of the 
high representative. The result was agreements 
on police vetting with both entities.  
 
The review process started in 1999 where 
23.751 people registered themselves as police 
officers. Only people registering would be 
vetted and either certified or not certified.476 
This was already a significantly lower number 
than the 44.750 reported by the UN Secretary 
General during a reconnaissance mission in 
1995.477 The number in the Secretary 
General’s report may be a little high due to the 
                                              
 
471 Dayton Agreement annex 4, article VI(1c) 
472 ECHR article 6. 
473 Report of the Secretary-General, S/1995/1031: 22 
474 Mayer-Reickh 2007: 187 
475 Dayton Agreement: Annex 7 Chapter 1 article 3e 
476 Mayer-Reickh 2007: 188 
477 Report of the Secretary-General, S/1995/1031: 22 
chaotic situation in 1995, but the difference is 
too large for it not to be an indicator that a 
significant portion of the people acting as 
police in 1995 either did not wish to be 
investigated for certification, had left the 
profession, or left the country in the 
intermediate years. Of the registered 23.751, 
16.803 were provisionally authorized, the 
remaining were excluded immediately for 
indicators that were easily determined, 
citizenship, age, whether they had police 
training, and whether they were actually doing 
police work. The provisionally authorized were 
then certified following an extensive 
background check and were not certified if 
they had lied to the UNMIBH, broken the law, 
lacked integrity during the conflict, or if they 
violated property legislation. The violation of 
property legislation is an indicator of wartime 
misconduct because many minority families 
were forced to leave their apartments, which in 
turn had been taken over by paramilitary 
forces.478 
 
A central point from the UNMIBH police reform 
when analysed with the theoretical framework 
presented in this article is that the standard of 
proof utilised in the vetting process was 
‘grounds for suspicion’, the same standard of 
proof that requires domestic police to start a 
criminal investigation. The officers did not get 
the possibility of contradiction or oral 
presentation. While this would be a problem in 
a criminal trial, the implementation of this 
standard of proof is in line with the UN 
recommendation of ‘respect towards both 
victim and the accused’. It facilitated a fast 
vetting, which was respectful towards victims 
who needed the people responsible for 
atrocities out of the police force as soon as 
possible, and it was respectful towards the 
accused in that it applied a consistent and 
relatively strict standard of proof. An issue 
with the process was that it lacked a 
mechanism for transferring the information 
gathered in the background check to police 
investigators and criminal courts for 
prosecution. When the certification process 
was over, the information on certified and non-
certified police was archived in UN archives in 
the US rather than turned over to police, which 
made it difficult to determine, whether a new 
recruit was in fact a previously non-certified 
police officer with a history of human rights 
abuse. Both the risk of rehire and the lack of 
prosecution of non-certified is problematic and 
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not respectful towards victims.479 An appeal 
mechanism was planned for officers that were 
not certified and wished to have their case 
reviewed, but the abrupt discontinuation of the 
process in 2002 meant that many did not get a 
chance to utilise it – which is not in line with 
respect for the accused.  
 
In relation to including civil society and 
informing the public, the police reform 
included establishing a civilian commissioner’s 
office for police complaints and introducing 
new uniforms, insignia and procedures. This is 
important to the goal of restoring faith in 
institutions in addition to restoring fairness of 
institutions.  
 
The UN guideline of offering attention to skill 
and affording the same protections to new and 
existing civil servants were both completed by 
creating the new police academy for training 
new officers. The police reform has been 
criticised from both victims associations, non-
certified police, and academics reviewing it. A 
major problem was its abrupt termination in 
2002 when the EU police task force took over 
from the UN international police force. This left 
a situation with uncertainty about the rights to 
review of the decision for non-certified police, 
some courts found the non-certification to be a 
violation of labour laws while others denied 
that they had jurisdiction.480 This means that 
the security concern about the future of the 
many disarmed police voiced in 1995 by the 
secretary general was not addressed.481 
Positive outcomes of the reform include greater 
faith in the police force also from minorities, 
greater representativeness both ethnically and 
gender wise, and fewer crimes against 
minorities.482 
 
The judicial reform 
The post-Dayton judicial system needed a 
serious overhaul. Many high level judges and 
prosecutors had left the country during the 
conflict, and the remaining were a mix of 
competent and incompetent judges, too many 
with nationalist agendas. Moreover, the 
judicial system was fragmented into territories 
that worked independently from one another, 
leading to arbitrariness depending on which 
court a case ended up before. The many local 
courts resulted in a very high number of 
judges, administrators and prosecutors, which 
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was expensive, while the courts were still 
inefficient and had huge backlogs of cases.483 
 
The reform was undertaken by the 
independent judicial commission, a body 
under the office of the High Representative. 
The goal was to reduce the overall number of 
judges, improve ethnic and gender 
representativeness, and improve competence 
and efficiency. The method was a state-wide 
reappointment process where all judges and 
prosecutors were dismissed and invited to 
apply for the new positions in the reformed 
court system. The reappointment process of 
reading applications and conducting interviews 
was undertaken by three judicial councils, one 
from each entity and one on the state level. All 
councils were a mix of prosecutors, judges and 
attorneys from both entities as well as 
international members, all appointed by the 
High Representative.484 
 
The result was a reduction in the number of 
courts, judges and prosecutors by about a 
third each. All personnel could apply for more 
than one position, and outside applicants 
could compete as well. The process did 
improve confidence in the judicial system,485 
and the ethnic representativeness,486 but it 
was costly: 140 staff worked full time in 21 
months to appoint approximately one 
thousand judges and prosecutors. Unlike the 
police reform, the judicial councils had 
national as well as international staff and 
following the reform the three councils were 
merged into one, the High Judicial and 
Prosecutorial Council (HJPC), which was 
nationalised and is now in charge of 
appointment and discipline. This meant that 
the judicial reform did not have the same 
contingency problem that the police reform 
had, and that it did a better job of including 
locals and civil society in the process.  
 
In 2015, the EU has reviewed the judicial 
reform, and found the Bosnian courts to be in 
line with European standards on paper 
regarding ethical standards, competence, 
impartiality, and cooperation between the 
entities, but there is a lack of safeguards to 
ensure the goals. Moreover, a case still takes 
on average seven years to make it through the 
judicial system, but the courts are chipping 
away at the backlog by completing on average 
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110 percent of the number of cases they get in 
a year.487 
 
The reappointment process can be said to be in 
line with the UN guidelines in the following 
manner: (1) Respect towards victims and the 
accused is the most problematic one since 
judges generally have life tenure, which was 
suspended in this process, only to be 
reinstated afterwards. While the citizens have 
suffered from an inefficient and partial judicial 
system, there were no victims in the same 
sense as in the police reform, because the 
main issue with the judicial system was not 
lack of integrity, but lack of competence. (2) 
Inclusion of civil society and informing the 
public was accomplished by publishing the 
new hires in the official gazette. Civil society 
was included only indirectly in advising the 
councils generally and not on individual 
judges. (3) Attention to skills was the main 
part of the reappointment process. A problem 
with the process was a lack of good applicants. 
There were only about two applicants per 
position, and by the end of the process, 8 
percent of positions remained unfilled.488 (4) 
Process and protections to both existing and 
future employees was accomplished by having 
both existing and new applicants take part in 
the competition for the positions.  
 
Conclusion 
Institutional reform is a mechanism for 
ensuring the right to non-recurrence. It should 
not, and cannot be used to ensure the right to 
justice. It should contribute to the right to 
truth and the right to justice, by passing on 
the information gathered in the vetting process 
to investigative truth commissions and to the 
judicial system for criminal prosecution. 
Because institutional reform is about the right 
to non-recurrence and not the right to justice, 
it cannot take away the accused’s personal 
freedom, and subsequently, vetting and 
lustration mechanisms do not have to comply 
with the protections afforded in court trials. 
The only thing an individual risks in a 
lustration process is their job, and because of 
this, they are not protected by the human right 
of nullum poena sine lege. The prohibition of 
retroactive law only applies in criminal court 
cases.  
 
Although job security is not protected by the 
prohibition of retroactive law, lustration 
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mechanisms can leave large groups of 
disgruntled former civil servants out of a job. 
This is problematic for economic prosperity 
and unemployment rates, and in the cases 
where they are dismissed for lack of integrity 
and human rights abuse, it can be a security 
problem as well. To ensure the fairness, 
effectiveness and safety of institutional reform, 
the UN has issued four guidelines, (1) respect 
for both victims and the accused, (2) inclusion 
of civil society and informing the public, (3) 
attention to skills and competence, and (4) 
process and protections afforded to both 
existing and future employees.  
 
UN bodies under the Office of the High 
Representative undertook the BiH police- and 
judicial reform, and they appear to have had 
the guidelines in mind. There have however 
been constraints in the form of political 
pressure, time and resources. A key problem 
with the police reform was its abrupt 
conclusion and lack of information sharing 
both for criminal prosecution purposes and for 
vetting future employees. Additionally, both the 
many non-certified police, and the large 
number of officers that never submitted their 
case for review could pose a security risk that 
may have to be addressed. The judicial reform 
employed instead a joint approach with both 
national and international staff in the 
reappointment councils, and a future 
assurance in the form of the councils 
continuing as one monitoring body after the 
reform. The main challenges for the judicial 
system in BiH remain cooperation between the 
entities, elimination of the large backlog of 
cases, and attracting enough qualified 
candidates for judge and prosecutor positions. 
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